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"Every social situation is the heritage of preceding
situations and takes over not only their cultures,
their dispositions, and their 'spirit', but also
elements of their social structure and concentrations
of power.... The social pyramid is never made of a
single substance, is never seamless. There is no single
Zeitgeist, except in the sense of a construct. This
means that in explaining any historical course or
situation, account must be taken of the fact that much
in it can only be explained by the survival of elements
that are actually alien to its own trends.... The co-
existence of essentially different mentalities and
objective facts must form part of any general theory."
Joseph A. Schumpeter
Imperialism and Social Classes: two essays,
(New York: Meridan Books, 1955), p. 111.
The Historical Fragility of Dutch Corporatism
a dissertation overview'
by Anton C. Hemerijck
Tilburg University, the Netherlands
Balliol College, Oxford
1. The Eindhoven Lecture
As a senior in high school - to be specific on the 17th of May 1977
- I was unexpectedly introduced to the contemporary corporatist
debate. On this day, shortly before the Dutch General Elections of
the same year, I attended a memorable lecture by the then lame duck
prime minister Joop den Uyl, a social-democrat whom I greatly
admired. Speaking at the Technical University of Eindhoven, Den Uyl
insisted at the outset of his address that he was there neither as
the prime minister, nor as the leader of the Dutch social-
democratic party, the Partii van de Arbeid, but instead as a
'simple economist from Buitenveldert', his hometown. Den Uyl's
self-proclaimed economist's 'objectivity' concealed the value-laden
1 This paper was written during my stay as a Visiting Scholar at
CIS/MIT in 1989. I would like to thank Professors Suzanne Berger,
Douglas Forsyth and Richard Locke at MIT and Professor Charles
Maier at Harvard for their helpful comments and useful
suggestions. Amongst my peers I am grateful to Karen Alter, Brian
Burgoon and David Miliband for carefully reading the manuscript.
2stance of what came to be known as the "Eindhoven Lecture"2 . The
address was perhaps political in a more emphatic sense than would
be true of a political party rally. By deliberately distancing
himself from the momentary context of the upcoming elections, Den
Uyl affirmed his intent to tackle one of the fundamental problems
of the political situation in a non-partisan way. Being primarily
addressed to students, as a part of a lecture series on the 'power
and impotence of -parliamentary democracy', the speech did have an
academic flavour. Still, rereading the lecture after more than a
decade, I suspect Den Uyl spoke at Eindhoven less as an impartial
economist than as a frustrated prime-minister and a dispirited
Social Democrat, whose progressive commitment to the redistribution
of 'wealth, knowledge, and power' in Dutch society was thwarted
both by his Christian Democratic coalition partners and by
organized private forces in the Netherlands over his three and a
half years' in power.
The "Eindhoven Lecture" was the Dutch prime-minister's
contribution to the fashionable debate on the 'ungovernability' of
Western polities. It was argued that the normal operation of
Western political institutions - democratic governance, electoral
procedures, parliamentary systems, and interest group politics -
had consistently produced ineffective, inefficient, unstable and
illegitimate outcomes since the 1960s. Den Uyl's speech was
2. Uyl, J. den, 'Die tijd komt nooit meer terug', in Wiardi
Beckman Stichting, En toch beweegt het.. ., Van Loghum Slaterus,
Deventer, 234 ff.
3primarily directed against the New Right critique of the so-called
'overloaded' welfare state. His address was appropriately published
with a translation of the controversial Encounter essay by the
American Nobel laureate and neo-liberal partisan Milton Friedman,
"The line we dare not cross: the fragility of freedom at '60%'"3
in the popular Dutch academic magazine intermediair4 .
The "Eindhoven Lecture" is best introduced in juxtaposition
to the views of Friedman, whose essay was no less emphatically
political than Den Uyl's speech. Despite their contrasting
assessments of the political paralysis of liberal democracy, there
are several striking similarities between the two texts. First of
all, both economists claim to render objective empirical diagnoses
of the political situation. Secondly, neither makes an attempt to
spell out what should be done. Both argue that perverse policies
are being pursued, namely: the politicization of economics,
following Friedman, and the bureaucratization of politics and
society, according to Den Uyl. True to the spirit of the
ungovernability debate both men exaggerate these trends and craft
apocalyptic scenarios of the demise of democracy.
3 Encounter, November 8, 1976, 7-14.
4 Daudt, H., Wolk, E. van der, 'Bedreigde Democratie?',
parlementaire democratie en overheidsbemoeienis in de economie,
Intermediair 1/2, Amsterdam, 1978, also published in bookform
under the same title by Van Gorcum, Assen, 1978. The special 1978
New Year's issue of the magazine also contained discussions with
eight renowned Dutch economists and an extended intereview with
Den Uyl in which he replied to his critics.
4In "The line we dare not cross" Friedman advances the thesis
that liberal democracy is irretrievably undermined when the share
of public spending in the national income reaches 60%. Where
governments cross this critical line, state intervention can only
be funded through growing deficits and runaway inflation, which
inevitably lead to financial chaos. Ensuing 'market failures' will
consequently backfire into the political system, culminating in a
takeover of a totalitarian regime from either the extreme Left or
extreme Right.
At the heart of Friedman ungovernability argument lies, what
he calls, the 'fundamental fallacy of the welfare state'; 'the
attempt to do good at somebody else's expense'. The reasons for the
declining governability under welfare capitalism are
straightforward, as he points out:
First, nobody spends somebody else's money as carefully
as he spends his own. That is why trying to do good at
someone else's expense leads to financial crisis. Second,
if you are trying to do good at somebody else's expense,
you have to take money away from him. So force, coercion,
destruction of freedom is at the very bottom, at the very
source,5 of the attempts to do good at somebody else's
expense.
By measuring individual freedom in terms of the proportion of
state intervention in the economy Friedman's ungovernability thesis
stands squarely in the tradition of 'laissez-faire' liberalism.
Laissez-faire liberalism discerns individual liberty as deriving
directly from economic property rights. Its inherent conception of
5 Friedman, Encounter, 11.
5'negative' freedom - the absence of coercion - allows no way of
reconciling liberty with an interventionist state. Only individuals
can judge what they want. The less the state interferes in their
lives the more freedom individuals have to set their own
priorities. The tradition of 'laissez-faire' liberalism,
furthermore, ignores the very fact that economic development itself
has made state regulation of economic activities unavoidable, as
Karl Polanyi has showed. Moreover, 'laissez-faire' liberalism has
no basis for evaluating or distinguishing between forms of state
activity with respect to their varying implications for personal
freedom. Finally, in contrast to the Social Democratic tradition,
to which Den Uyl is attached, it dismisses ownership structures,
economic power relationships and concomitant maldistributions of
income and wealth.
Friedman's solution to the ungovernability crisis of Western
polities lies in the return to the integrity of the market which
can only be guaranteed by protecting the operation of markets from
politics through a strict separation of economic and political
spheres. Politics should be constitutionally prevented from
interfering with the market's automatic 'clearing mechanisms'.
At Eindhoven the Dutch prime-minister did not share Friedman's
worries. When the 'simple economist from Buitenveldert' delivered
his speech there, the Dutch economy had already in 1975 crossed
Friedman's budgetary line on the road to economic and political
doom. In 1977 the share of the public sector in the national income
came to over 62%, an increase of over 27% since 1950. Den Uyl found
6the proportion of state intervention in the economy a rather
misleading indicator for 'government overload'. The Dutch economist
stressed that in the Netherlands this dramatic increase had only
led to a relatively small growth in direct public spending. The
growth of the ratio of government expenditure to the national
income was for most part the result of a sharp rise in transfer
payments, from 19.3% of the national income in 1950 to 39.8% in
1977. After transfer payments, which include grants, subsidies, and
social security benefits, the part of the national income spent by
private institutions and individuals had stayed remarkably constant
for many decades at about 78%6. Den Uyl viewed transfer payments,
through which the welfare state passes on income to private
households, in fact as widening the purchasing power of private
recipients without expanding the production and consumption of the
state7. He therefore concluded that the increase in the ratio of
transfer payments to the national income should be viewed as an
indicator of the level of redistribution attempted by a
democratically elected government and not as an allocative figure,
as Friedman would have it.
6 CPB, De Nederlandse Economie in 1980, De Staatsuitgeverij,
Den Haag, 1976.
Den Uyl could have added to this that the overwhelming
majority of direct public investments are commissioned within the
private sector. See Oosten, van, in Socialisme en Democratie,
1977.
72. The ambiguous legitimacy of corporatism
After having reproached what he later called Friedman's dubious
"ingenious simplicity"8, Den Uyl embarked on his own anxiety. The
prime-minister saw democratic rule threatened by the growth of what
he called the 'clientelistic network around the state'. The
bureaucratization of interlinkages between the state apparatus and
private organized interests had, according to Den Uyl, critically
undermined parliamentary accountability, as the following lengthy
passage makes clear:
It is better to focus on the frequently marginal
functioning of government in the midst of a multitude of
regulating organs and organizations. Here I am returning
to the theme of 'power and impotence of parliamentary
democracy'. Government exercises its power and authority
through its permanent interplay with social interest
groups. (...)
When we observe how much government - the state -
has to share power, and how it shares it every day, in
all imaginable forms of consultation, with private
organizations, large corporations, institutionalized
interests, it seems rather foolish (...) to evoke the
nightmare of an all powerful ruling state. Kafkaesque
conditions are not encountered within the government
apparatus, but at the interface between the fourth and
fifth powers, where the public apparatus and the private
organizations meet, interact, confer with one another
continually, and where one cannot retrace where decisions
are being prepared and where they are reached. Where
state power is shared with private organizations (...)
that is where twilight areas develop. (...) Bureaucracy
is present in many forms in our society, but - and I
repeat - predominantly there where private organizations
and government share power (translation ACH).
8 Daudt, Wolk, van der, Bedreigde Democratie, 114.
9 Ibid., 48-49.
8By way of empirically substantiating his 'ungovernability'
argument, Den Uyl referred to the 1977 study of the Scientific
Council for Government Policy on "External Advice Organs to the
Central Government", a survey which had catalogued all the
interlinkages between the state bureaucracy and the network of
organized interests in the various kinds of consultative bodiesp.
The study identified 402 consultative organs, a doubling since
1967. A fair number had been given independent executive powers.
Den Uyl, a parliamentarian at heart, abhorred these unofficial,
semi-legitimate, and secretive bodies, which made up, what he
called, the 'fourth and fifth powers', the 'iron ring' of the state
bureaucracy, on the one hand, and private organized interests, on
the other. The expansion of this type of back-stage policy-making
he saw invading the proper sphere of parliament and subverting the
system of checks and balances inherent in Montesquieu's 'Trias
Politica'; the separation of the three autonomous judicial, legal,
and executive, powers of liberal democratic government.
By focusing on the 'twilight area' of liberal democracy, where
state agencies share sovereignty with private interest
organizations beyond the reach of parliament, the prime-minister
touched on the essence of the debate about modern corporatism. The
Dutch politician would undoubtedly agree with the following
1 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Externe
Adviesorganen aan de Centrale Overheid, Den Haag, de
Staatsuitgeverij, 1977.
9statement by the political scientist Philippe Schmitter, the
founding father of contemporary corporatist scholarship:
The key to understanding the various crises of
governability lies in the dimly lit arena of functional
interest intermediation through highly formalized and
specialized organizations in direct relaon with the
bureaucratic apparatus of the modern state
Schmitter, like Den Uyl, recognized that what should have been the
open field between state and civil society, posited by classical
liberal and pluralist theory, where power and influence upon
democratic government are freely competed for, had been replaced
or supplemented by a plethora of formal interdependent
organizational linkages and processes of political bargaining
between state officials and representatives of major interest
associations.
Notwithstanding their similar diagnoses, as distinctly
different from the one put forward by Friedman, the American
political scientist and the Dutch prime-minister part company when
it came to evaluating the potential political effect of the
blurring boundaries between public and private realms. Whereas Den
Uyl viewed the sharing of state power by private groups as the
source of ungovernability, Schmitter, on the other hand, argued
that the expansion and bureaucratization of the semi-official
linkages between public and private power could in fact facilitate
11 Schmitter, P.C. 'Interest intermediation and regime
governability in contemporary Western Europe and North America',
in Suzanne Berger, Organizing interests in Western Europe,
Pluralism, Corporatism, and the transformation of politics,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 288.
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regime governability by injecting an element of stability into the
political system.
In Den Uyl's view, the sharing of public power by private
groups was the central 'political failure' of contemporary public
policy-making, a misguided attempt on the part of state officials
to supplement their authority by coopting private representative
groups to policy-making processes. Where governments pursue
corporatist strategies, he inferred, public policy was made
dependent upon the approval of private organized interests, which
in Den Uyl's scenario would inevitably invite a further
encroachment of strong organized forces upon government. Ensuing
'political failures' would consequently lead to subordinating
public policy to the most dominant sectional demands in society,
culminating in the stifling of the autonomous decision-making
capacities of the democratic political center.
Schmitter did not share Den Uyl's vision of political inertia.
On the contrary, he welcomed, what he called, 'corporatist interest
intermediation' as a positive development which could in fact
'lighten the direct burden of the state' . In Schmitter's opinion
the political center could forestall ungovernability exactly by
incorporating representatives of large private interest
organizations into the public policy-making processes. In return
for letting private organizations participate in the formation and
implementation of specific policies, governments could widen their
Z Ibid, 312.
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sources of information, gain expertise, facilitate communication,
and employ the executive-organizational capacities of organized
interests. By placing the responsibility of policy-making on those
immediately affected rather than through mediation of the blunt
instrument of parliament government could reinforce and enhance
their control over both the policy-making process and its outcome,
Schmitter's quantitative empirical cross-national survey
showed a positive relationship between corporatist patterns of
interest intermediation and measures of relative regime
governability (in terms citizen unruliness, government unstableness
and fiscal ineffectiveness) His study accorded that countries
which made wide use of corporatist practices, such as Austria and
Norway, had proven to be more governable than the more classical
pluralist democracies, like the United Kingdom and the United
States, in the wake of the economic shocks of 1970s.
The key point of difference between Den Uyl and Schmitter does
not so much concern their respective empirical observations, but
rather their contrasting notions of the political legitimacy of
corporatism. It is this question of legitimation which lies at the
very heart of the ambiguous acceptance of corporatism under liberal
democracy. Den Uyl judged corporatist practices according to the
principles of parliamentary sovereignty and executive autonomy of
liberal democratic government. Since corporatist practices operate
outside the canons of liberal constitutional orthodoxies, Den Uyl
B Ibid, 311-318.
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judged corporatist arrangements as illegitimate. Schmitter, on the
other hand, approached corporatism from the basis of 'value-free'
empirical social science. His endeavor involved a comparative
empirical assessment of regime governability in terms of
quantifiable aggregate outcomes in relation to different patterns
of interest intermediation. He discovered a positive correlation
between regime governability and the existence of corporatist
arrangements. The fact that public policy-making in corporatist
countries was a good deal less visible and accountable for did not
affect Schmitter's benign assessment of the corporatist political
practice.
The invisibility of corporatist policy-making distressed, of
course, the lame duck prime-minister and embittered Social Democrat
who was running again for parliament, which brings us back to the
authenticity of the 'Eindhoven Lecture' as a political speech. To
paraphrase Max Weber, Den Uyl and Schmitter's entries into the
ungovernability problematique expose their respective 'vocations'
as a politician and a social scientist . The politician Den Uyl,
living 'for' politics as a cause, considered the ungovernability
theme from the 'value-standpoint' of the 'procedural legitimacy'
of parliamentary politics and democratic decision-making.
Schmitter, in embracing the academic virtues of integrity, distance
and clarity, living 'for' science and as a political scientist only
1 Weber, M, 'Politics as a vocation' and 'Science as a vocation,
in Gerth, H.H., Mills, C. Wright, From Max Weber, Essays in
sociology, 77-156.
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indirectly 'of f' politics, adopted a perspective of the legitimacy
of objective outcomes. He evaluated regime ungovernability in terms
of 'value-neutral' quantitative aggregate outcomes. Yet, on the
basis of these findings, Schmitter, in the end ironically no less
emphatically political than either Den Uyl or Friedman, urged, what
he called, the modern conservative ruler to actively strengthen the
organized power of private forces vis-a-vis the state to overcome
the crisis of ungovernability, as this quote reveals:
Rather than proliferating the 'number of citizens' and
the 'spheres of interest', the modern conservative ruler
concerned with governability would diminish their number,
encourage their centralization and concentration of
authority, grant them privileged monopolistic access,
and, above all, extend the sphere of governance by
licencing or devolving upon them powers to take degisions
binding on their members and even on non-members .
Because political legitimacy today is to an unusual degree
based on economic success, the choice of effective economic
policies has, indeed, become the most important political need in
liberal democratic capitalism. Therefore, Schmitter's advice is,
perhaps, well taken by contemporary rulers. Still, since
corporatism in its modern form is combined with liberal
parliamentarism under the dominance of the latter, it should also
be stressed, with Den Uyl, that there is a pressing need to draw
corporatist arrangements into constitutional analyses to recapture
the essence of the Rule of Law upon which liberal democracy is
based.
Berger, Organizing Interests, 312.
14
3. A conflation of terms
Where the "Eindhoven Lecture" is explicitly devoted to the Dutch
political situation, Den Uyl's otherwise theoretically insightful
argument becomes unintelligible. Here the political frustrations
of the prime-minister get in the way of his general argument. The
confusion is particularly salient in Den Uyl's rather general and
imprecise application of his 'iron ring' of 'fourth and fifth'
powers, comprising all imaginable forms of institutionalized
interlinkages between government and private groups, whether
social, political, cultural, or economic. By employing a political
science vocabulary he further mystified his student audience when
he argued that:
(...) concepts like the concerted economy, the coalition
model, the cartel democracy, are but so ? any ways of
describing the limited power of government.
By lumping these terms together, the "Eindhoven Lecture" obscures
important questions about inter-connections between key aspects of
Dutch economy and society. It is appropriate to elucidate these
concepts as they are crucial to an adequate understanding of Dutch
corporatism.
First of all, the concept of the 'concerted economy' has its
roots in the Dutch industrial relations literature". The term
b Daudt, Wolk, van der, Bedreigde Democratie, 49.
1 Windmuller, J.P, Labor relations in the Netherlands, Ithaca NY,
Cornell University Press, 1969.
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explicitly refers to the interactions among organized business,
organized labor, and government with respect to macro economic
policy-making. Schmitter and other students of modern corporatism
have deliberately confined themselves to this level of analysis.
Central to their notions of corporatism is that formal
representatives of the functional interests of organized capital
and labor share authority with public officials in economic
decision-making platforms and play important roles in the
implementation of economic policies.
Secondly, Den Uyl's concepts of the 'coalition model' and the
'cartel democracy' are directly taken from the debate on
consociational democracy in the study of comparative politics.
Whereas the concept of corporatism emerged from the study of
industrial relations, the concept of consociational democracy
originated in the much broader international study of coalition
governmentsE. Central to consociational democracies is that various
party elites co-operate under a spirit of non-competitive
acceptance in both government and parliament. ' The Dutch
parliamentary system has long been considered one of the clearest
manifestations of a consociationalism.
Den Uyl's failure to distinguish between economic, political,
social, and cultural spheres in his analysis of the Dutch malaise
appears even more prominent in the extended interview given by Den
E Lijphart, A., Democracies, Patterns of majoritarian and
consensus government in twenty-one countries, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1984.
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Uyl to the editors of Intermediair. Here Den Uyl makes an attempt
to elucidate historically the contemporary experience of Dutch
politics by situating it in the context of the societal peculiarity
of 'pillarization', which, he claimed, has made politics in the
Netherlands very different from most other European nations. Most
sociologists have understood pillarization as the segmentation of
the social structure in pronounced cleavages along ascriptive lines
of race, religion, language, and ethnicity2. In the Netherlands
Calvinist and Catholic cleavages, and to a lesser extent, socialist
and liberal ideological divisions, have been the salient
subcultures or 'pillars'. In the first decades of the twentieth
century each 'pillar' generated its own subcultural array of social
organizations, ranging from political parties, trade unions,
employers organizations, schools and universities, health and
welfare agencies, mass media, and sports and leisure associations.
Elaborating on the development of the welfare state as the
case in point of Dutch ungovernability, Den Uyl emphasized that the
welfare state in the Netherlands essentially emerged from the
'private' welfare systems of the different denominational and
political subcultures of the early 1900s. Its historical
development concerned an evolutionary process in which 'private'
welfare arrangements of the respective pillar organizations have
Daudt, Wolk, van der, Bedreigde Democratie, 113-142.
See David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1978.
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gradually given way to 'public' welfare provisions. In due course,
former functions of subcultural organizations were taken over by
state agencies. However, this piecemeal evolution did not reach its
final 'public' conclusion, much to Den Uyl's dismay. There still
remain strong remnants of the pillarized past in Dutch social
policies. Although practically all social services are today
financed by public means, only a few are directly delivered by the
state. Instead, independent specialized, professionalized,
bureaucratized, neither public nor private, welfare institutions,
provide services in the fields of education, welfare, and health
care. Having cut themselves loose from their pillars, they make
huge claims on the state bureaucracy and finances. These bodies
make up the massive independent 'iron ring' of the 'fourth and
fifth' powers, in Den Uyl's argument. Dutch politics has fallen
hostage to the secular expansion and bureaucratization of these
originally pillarized institutions. In his final analysis, Den Uyl
stresses that the growth of the semi-governmental bureaucratic
network is neither the product nor the result of government
intervention. On the contrary, Dutch ungovernability is the direct
result of the historical passivity and weakness of the Dutch state
in the face of the resilience of the encompassing pillars.
In the Dutch context, corporatism, narrowly confined to the
sphere of economic policy-making, is indeed inextricably bound up
with the socio-political phenomena of pillarization and
consociationalism. However, any exposition of the political
situation in the Netherlands that declines to distinguish, as the
18
'Eindhoven Lecture' does, between the extra-parliamentary practice
of corporatism, the parliamentary practice of consociationalism,
and the societal dynamic of pillarization, will inevitably fail to
understand profound changes in Dutch politics and society from the
mid 1960s through to the 1980s. Corporatism, consociationalism,
and pillarization cannot be conflated. Only with clear analytical
distinctions are we able to trace and account for the significance
of the institutional factors of consociationalism and pillarization
in the evolution of corporatist policy-making in the Netherlands,
which is the principal aim of the present dissertation.
For the purpose of the thesis I wish to define corporatism,
in keeping with contemporary political economy scholarship as:
The specific extra-parliamentary political practice of
close and highly structured bargained cooperative
interaction, under liberal democratic rule, between the
formal representatives of trade unions and employers
associations in concertation with government, pertaining
to issues of economic policy-making at the level of the
nation state.
Having defined corporatism in its contemporary form as subordinate
to liberal parliamentarism and being voluntarily pursued and agreed
to by the three so-called 'social partners', regular prefixes like
neo, liberal, societal, and democratic are no longer necessary.
This however does not obviate, and indeed may provoke, the kind of
tensions, Den Uyl alluded to, between corporatist and parliamentary
forms of representation.
In compliance with the theme of consociational democracy in
the study of comparative politics, I define consociationalism as:
The parliamentary political practice whereby elites of
divided minority parties accommodate divergent interests
19
and subcultural demands and share power in so-called
'Grand Coalition' governments under an ethos of mutual
non-competitive acceptance.
Finally, following Dutch sociological scholarship, I define
pillarization as:
The societal dynamic through which particular worldviews
or religious expressions (Weltanschauungen) become the
focus of social and political participation, resulting
in pronounced, internally cohesive and externally
separated or segmented, subcultures.
The key theoretical idea of the present study in historical
political economy is that modes of social and economic regulation,
are shaped less by particular policy objectives, such as balanced
economic growth, full employment and price stability, than by the
particular historical settings in which regulation takes place.
With regulation I mean patterns by which activities and
relationships in the sphere of production and distribution of
social and economic resources are coordinated and allocated, and
real and potential conflicts structurede. No matter how similar the
economic structures and technological environments of different
national economies are, styles of policy-making, social norms and
values, institutional arrangements such as administrative and
organizational routines, employed in social and economic
regulation, vary remarkably from country to country. Even if we
keep in mind the plurality policy arenas in single countries, from
Lange, P., Regini, M., 'introduction: interests and
institutions - forms of social regulation and public policy-
making', in Lange, P., Regini, M, Public policy and social
regulation in Italy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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a comparative point of view, there remain large measures of
coherence and consistence in national forms of regulation.
The thesis, therefore, adopts a so-called 'politics of
economics' perspective to the study of Dutch corporatism. This
approach to the study of political economy has been developed by
a number of American political scientists associated with Harvard's
Center for European Studies2 . The 'politics of economics'
perspective is distinctly different from the dominant 'public
choice' or the 'economics of politics' approach, which attempts to
apply the methodology and analytical tools of neo-classical
economic theory to the study of public policy. The 'politics of
economics' perspective does not lend itself easily to rigorous
hypothetic-deductive modelling and testing. Its programmatic
argument concentrates on the institutional context in which public
policy is made with a strong focus on the historical factors that
have affected state administration, the organization of civil
society and the structure of the economy. Its substantive concern
2 See for example Peter Gourevitch, Politics in times,
comparative responses to international economic crisis, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1986, Peter Hall, Governing the
economy, the politics of state intervention in Britain and
France, Oxford, Polity Press, 1986, Peter j. Katzenstein, Small
States in world markets, industrial policy in Europe, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1985, Charles S. Maier, In search of
stability, exploration in historical political economy,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, Michael J. Piore,
Charles S. Sabel, The second industrial divide, possibilities for
prosperity, New York, Basic Books, 1984, John Zysman,
Governments. Markets and Growth, financial systems and the
politics of industrial change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
1983.
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is the effect of processes of mediation between socioeconomic
interests through an institutional setting on social and economic
regulation. Its main actors are, therefore, collective rather than
individual. The methodological hallmark of the 'politics of
economics' perspective lies in its comparative bent, highlighting
patterns of national distinctiveness as much as the common ground
of various political economies. With its special attention for
historical and comparative aspects of social and political action
the 'politics of economics' approach follows in the footsteps of
the historical political economy of Max Weber.
While conducted within the general framework of the
comparative approach to corporatism, the dissertation departs from
conventional corporatist research in two ways. First of all, the
study concentrates on a single political economy - that of the
Netherlands. Secondly, it traces the genesis and evolution of Dutch
corporatism further back into history than the period of the
establishment of corporatist arrangements after 1945 through to the
alleged prime time of corporatist crisis-management of the mid-
1970s.
The Netherlands is a particularly interesting case to examine
from the comparative 'politics of economics' perspective. To many
students of European corporatism Dutch economic policy-making seems
shot through with corporatist arrangements, so much so that it has
been frequently referred to as the 'harmony model' of political
economy. Most scholars of modern corporatism agree with Gerhard
Lehmbruch's observation that the Netherlands is an example of
22
corporatism 'par excellence': "The most elaborate
institutionalization of corporatism is to be found in the
Netherlands"3 . Yet, from the standpoint of the dominant 'social-
democratic' Scandinavian model of regulation, as exemplified by the
celebrated Swedish case, which views strong and unified working
class power in both party politics and the industrial arena as
necessary conditions for the adoption of corporatist practices,
the Netherlands is an anomaly . In Dutch history the political left
has been generally weak and the trade union movement internally
divided along pillar lines.
The thesis oscillates between two objectives: that of
examining the historical-empirical effect of consociationalism and
pillarization on the pathway of Dutch corporatist regulation, and
that of developing a comparative perspective to corporatist theory,
beyond the peculiarities of Dutch history. It is in this sense that
the dissertation can be labeled a 'theoretical country study'. The
constant tension between the historical-empirical and comparative-
theoretical poles of interest can be harmful to the overall
endeavor. There is the danger of doing injustice to historiography
by making too superficial an analysis of the case. On the other
Gerhard Lehmbruch, 'liberal corporatism and party government',
in Schmitter, P.C., Lehmbruch, G., Trends toward corporatist
intermediation, London, Sage, 1979, p. 165.
Gosta Esping Anderson, Politics against markets, the social
democratic road to power, Princeton NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1985.
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hand, there is the risk of succumbing too much to description of
minute particulars with the resultant of undermining the study's
general theoretical purpose. The present study is bound to do some
injustice to each of the two objectives. I strive for a reasonable
balance. The thesis is divided into four parts. Parts I is chiefly
comparative-theoretical. Parts II and III are mainly historical-
empirical.
4. Historical preconditions of corporatist political exchange
There is a distinctive lack of a serious historical dimension in
modern corporatist scholarship. In chapter 2, I will take a
critical stand against the domirnnt foci of corporatist research
on, first, cross-national quantitative surveys relying on
correlational methods merely covering recent decades, second,
vacuous synoptic theories of socio-economic development, and,
third, qualitative single case studies of solely postwar
developments. The chapter is especially critical of the second type
of theories, which have tried to cx, -ain corporatism with reference
to structural exigencies, imposing evolutionary schemes of socio-
economic development in terms of successive stages, each with their
own leads and lags. It is my contention, that there is a high
degree of indeterminacy in social and economic regulation. The
structure of the economy, the -t c'f technology, the location in
the international economy, chang-e n the relations of production,
etc., do not determine ultimate po' icy choices but demarcate the
range of regulatory options. Rergi ation between the collective
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actors of the state, organized capital and labor, is shaped by
politics, broadly defined, and cannot be reduced to some apparent
socio-economic logic that discounts conscious intentions of
historical agents. I, therefore, argue for a less reductionist, a
more dynamic and historical approach to the study of corporatism,
which leaves room for evaluating the many different non-economic,
social and political, forces that shape economic policy-making.
In an attempt to free corporatist theory from some of its
explicit structuralist and implicit teleological foundations, I
will, in chapter 3, develop a theoretical perspective on the
historical inter-connections of different institutional factors to
social and economic regulation across different nations. In it I
offer an analytical and conceptual framework that is conducive to
comparative-historical study of the different ways and various
degrees to which European political economies have adopted or
resisted corporatist arrangements. The overall exercise of the
chapter is geared towards a systematic effort to isolate a limited
number of preconditions, with the a view of laying out a set of
analytic tools necessary for historical-empirical analyses of
particular forms of regulation. The typology will be brought into
focus through a brief and cursory examination of recent experiences
in a number West European political economies.
The ideal-type method, expounded here, combines hypothetic-
deductive theories of how collective actors might 'rationally' be
expected to engage in corporatist arrangements in a given
situation, with emphasis on the historical insistence that what is
25
rational depends to a large extent on the institutional context of
that specific empirical situation. The political theorist
Allesandro Pizzorno has aptly described the corporatist practice
as a form of 'generalized political exchange' through which the
formal representatives of the producer groups of capital and labor
trade their capacity to mobilize constituent membership in exchange
for participation in the formation of social and economic policies
of the national states. Any empirical exposition of corporatist
arrangements under liberal democratic rule has to address the
question of how, in the absence of state coercion, the main actors
- organized labor, capital and state officials - voluntarily
decide to enter into such bargained co-operative relationships. Of
interest here are the institutional circumstances that allow the
corporatist type of political exchange to be pursued by each actor
alike. Empirically, Pizzorno's trade-off is dependent on both the
objective capacity and the subjective willingness of the three
collective actors to engage in corporatist practices. Building on
a variety of insights of corporatist theory and the vast
accumulation of empirical knowledge of corporatist experiences in
Western Europe, I will extract a generalizable typology of three
institutional, necessary but not sufficient, preconditions
fundamental to the initiation and sustenance of the corporatist
Allesandro Pizzorno, 'political exchange and collective
identity in industrial conflict, in Crouch, C.J., Pizzorno, A.,
The resurgence of class conflict in Western Europe since 1968,
London, Macmillan, 1978, vol 2, 277-298.
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type of 'political exchange'. Since, empirically, these
institutional co-ordinates are the products of history, I will
consider them as the 'genetically relevant co-ordinates' or
'historical preconditions' of corporatism.
It is appropriate briefly to specify the three historical
preconditions, which pertain to the institutional capacities of the
state and the functional organized interests, and the subjective
willingness, ideological dispositions, normative goals and purposes
of the respective collective or 'corporate' actors to engage in
corporatist bargaining processes.
The first historical precondition designates the institutional
capacity of state actors to 'share political space' with organized
groups from civil society. Colin Crouch has defined political space
as:
(...) that range of issues over which general, universal
decisions are made within a given political unit,
particularly decisions which ar seen by political actors
to affect overall social orde .
Crouch's notion of shared political space captures the reciprocity
of the relationship between functional organized interests and the
state in corporatist arrangements. By sharing political space a
state devolves part of its most distinctive resource - legitimate
coercion - to organized groups in civil society which it does not
administratively control.
Colin Crouch, 'sharing public space: states and organized
interests in Western Europe', in John Hall (ed), States in
Societies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, 179-180.
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The second historical precondition specifies the institutional
capacity of the societal actors of organized capital and labor to
represent workers and employers in corporatist arrangements, and
the ability of the leadership to discipline members to comply with
the agreements reached at the decision-making center. This
precondition revolves around three related organizational
exigencies: associational mobilization, associational
centralization, and associational concentration . Associational
mobilization refers to the extensive ability of organized interests
to aggregate large numbers of workers and producers in trade unions
and employer associations. Associational centralization pertains
to the intensive ability of functional organized interests to
organize tightly, to integrate vertically local and sectoral
affiliates in one federal national center or 'peak' organization,
with high levels of affiliate commitment to the center.
Associational concentration centers on the institutional capacity
of organized interests to integrate horizontally or unite producers
and workers into unified class-wide organizations.
Besides the necessary institutional capacities that enable
societal and state actors to engage in corporatist political
exchange, we also have to address the subjective willingness of the
social partners to pursue corporatist practices and agree and stick
to the trade-offs reached. Since objective situations are hardly
See Jelle Visser, In search of inclusive unionism, a
comparative analysis, Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, Phd
dissertation, 1987.
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ever clear, they admit different interpretations. Here embark on
the realm of ideology. Weber has argued that historical development
can in part be attributed to the effect of ideas on the action of
individuals and groups. He showed that subjectively intended
meaning is a centrally important component of socioeconomic
reality2. Next to Weber, Durkheim emphasized that norms, social
values of how people act morally in their relations with others,
are necessary for sustained social cooperation".
Because corporatist arrangements require consensus and trust
among the 'social partners' at the decision-making center, and
between corporate actors and their respective social bases, the
third precondition encompasses ideological dispositions and
normative goals and purposes, ideal interests, which are able to
support corporatist regulation and bolster the precarious
legitimacy of corporatism under liberal parliamentarism with
respect to the overall polity. This precondition includes a
horizontal, inter-organizational or Weberian, and a vertical,
intra-organizational or Durkheimian, dimension. At the horizontal
level it essentially revolves around the relative convergence of
notions of 'class interdependence' among the three corporate actors
to increase mutual trust. This includes labor's recognition of the
2 Weber, M., The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism,
New York, Charles Scribner, 1958 (1904-6).
2 Durkheim, E., The division of labor in society, London,
Macmillan, 1984 (1893).
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prerogative of private ownership and the acceptance of employers'
control over crucial economic decisions, especially investment. It
also pertains to capital's recognition of working-class
organization as the legitimate representative of labor in
collective bargaining procedures. Finally, it touches on
government's commitment to high levels of employment and the rights
of workers. At the vertical Durkheimian level it is linked to
normative expressions which intensify collective identities, social
cohesion and intra-organizational morale. A social group that can
increase mutual trust on the basis of ideology has a greater
capacity to strengthen membership loyalty and leadership authority
over rank-and-file. The formation of an autonomous and cohesive
collective identity depends to a large extent on an ideology and
a set of values for the definition a collective interest and the
selection of a course of collective action. Ideologies are not
'free floating' but the product of real social circumstances.
The suggested theoretically grounded typology of the three
historical co-ordinates of corporatism contains three distinct
advantages for interpreting various trajectories of economic
policy-making across advanced political economies. First of all,
because the preconditions are not defined exclusively in
corporatist terms, the typology permits systematic comparisons of
both corporatist and non-corporatist patterns of economic policy-
making. Secondly, it allows for variability and heterogeneity.in
social regulation in terms of outcomes, as possible states of a
dependent variable, which can be accounted for by variation among
30
the theoretically grounded independent variables of the three
historical preconditions. Thirdly, historical factors peculiar to
individual countries are allowed to explain for the respective
degrees of institutionalization of the three preconditions.
In terms of individual cases, the typology thus enables us to
assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of corporatist
arrangements in single countries in terms of the extent to which
these preconditions are met. From a comparative point of view, the
typology helps us to adequately account for much of the variation
of corporatist practices across Western Europe in terms of the
variation of the degree of institutionalization of the historical
preconditions.
5. The historical co-ordinates of Dutch corporatism
The historical-empirical second part of the thesis provides an
understanding of the origins of Dutch corporatism. The basic
objective is to demonstrate the extent to which the Dutch post-1945
'harmony model' of political economy evolved out of a far longer
and contingent process of institutional change than generally has
been thought relevant in modern corporatist research. Looking
backward for the roots of Dutch corporatism, chapter 4 through 6,
offer analytical examinations of the historical legacies which
cumulatively have given rise to institutional and cultural settings
in which it was easy for corporatist arrangements to take root
after 1945. They include historical reconstructions in terms of the
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historical development of the relevant historical preconditions in
Dutch politics and society in three separate chapters.
Chapter 4 traces the emergence of a state that is
institutionally capable and subjectively willing to share political
space with organized groups of civil society in Dutch history.
Following Hans Daalder and Jacques van Doorn, it argues that the
absence of absolutism, persistent presence of political
factionalism, and regional and religious diversity in Dutch
society, permitted the survival of pre-parliamentary traditions of
elite accommodation). These traditions encouraged the formation of
a nation state with a policy legacy of shared political space and
the rise of a public policy-making elite committed to the sharing
of public space with representative groups. The survival of these
policy legacies, subsequently, eased the formation of orthodox
Calvinist and Catholic social and political associations at the
'modernizing' turn of the 20th century. In turn, the piecemeal
segmentation of Dutch social and political life along the ascending
'pillar' lines permitted the establishment of the consociational
model of parliamentary politics in the Netherlands.
Contrary to Arend Lijphart's vision of consociational politics
as the outcome of deliberate elite efforts to counteract the
3) Daalder, H., 'the Netherlands , opposition in a segmented
society', in Dahl, R.A. (ed), Political Opposition in Western
Democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, 188-236,
Doorn, J.A.A., van, 'schets van de Nederlandse politieke
traditie', in Beus, J.W., de, Lehning, P.B., Doorn, J.A.A., van,
(eds), De ideologische driehoek, Nederlandse politiek in
historisch perspectief, Meppel, Boom, 1989.
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immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentationI
Daalder and van Doorn's developmental analyses suggest that the
older policy legacy of living together with many divided minority-
groups facilitated a peaceful and gradual transition towards forms
of political mobilization and organization along denominational
lines in the closing decades of the 19th century. In this
perspective, consociationalism is viewed not as a response to the
perils of subcultural splits, as Lijphart would have it, but rather
as the outgrowth, institutionalization, and formalization of an
older legacy of sharing political space.
What is important to underscore with Lijphart that the
political practice of consociationalism positively embraces the
sharing of political space as a rule of procedure. Through the
introduction of consociational politics major public activities of
both state -and civil society are compartmentalized and run
separately by and for different subcultural cleavages. Once
institutionalized, the commitment of government to the sharing of
public authority with private groups can in due course be
transmitted to other areas of public policy, such as to the sphere
of social and economic regulation.
Chapter 5 examines the historical foundation of the Dutch
pillarized or subculturally segmented system of industrial
relations. It focuses on the institutionalization of the
3 Lijphart, A., The politics of accommodation: pluralism and
democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1968.
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organizational co-ordinates of the corporatist exchange;
associational mobilization, centralization, and concentration of
functionally organized interests.
In the latter half of the 19th century two issues emerged on
the political agenda which shaped Dutch politics and society
thereafter: the 'school-issue' and the 'social question'. The late
19th century opposition to the latitudinarian liberal government
over the subject of religious schooling by orthodox Calvinist and
Roman Catholic minority groups induced the pillarization of Dutch
society. Religion hereby became both a divisive and a consolidating
force. Whereas it split mixed religious localities horizontally,
it fostered vertically integrated, strongly hierarchical,
associational linkages among like-minded believers across the
nation. The organizational build-up of Calvinist and Catholic
organizations and the consociational political practice further
encouraged the segmentation of Dutch society into separate
subcultural communities with cohesive collective identities. Once
firmly institutionalized, these very divisions nationalized and,
through consociationalism, further integrated and consolidated
Dutch social and political life".
Because the 'school-issue' preceded the take-off of
industrialization in the Netherlands after 1895, the 'social
question', the advent of working class protest, came to be tackled
See Knippenberg, H., Pater, B. de, De Eenwording van Nederland,
schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800, Nijmegen, SUN, 1988.
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and defined in terms of the already ongoing process of subcultural
segmentation. The politics of organized interests were consequently
shaped along the ascending ideological cleavages. The emerging two-
fold divided Calvinist-Catholic and religious-secular subcultural
geography of the Netherlands, consequently, cast the Dutch pattern
of industrial relations. This had two important consequences, one
favorably disposed to the emergence of corporatist regulation and
one harmful to corporatist political exchange. It encouraged, on
the one hand, the formation of solid, vertically integrated or
strongly centralized, 'peak' federations. On the other, it led to
an exceptionally horizontally segmented system of industrial
relations. Calvinist and Catholic trade unions emerged alongside
a socialist trade union movement and Calvinist and Catholic
employer associations next to secular liberal employer federations.
In short, with respect to the horizontal level of organizational
capacities of Dutch industrial relations associations, the emerging
system was inherently weak, far removed from the corporatist ideal
type of integrated and unified class-wide organization.
Chapter 6 considers the historical institutionalization of the
ideological and normative precondition of corporatism. In a very
modest way this chapter provides a contribution to the illustration
of the historical effect of ideas in shaping Dutch corporatism. It
concentrates on the movement towards ideological reconciliation
between Catholic and Calvinist intellectuals on issues of economic
and social organization and the shift from Marxism towards
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revisionist planism in social democratic circles during the
interwar parenthesis.
While the subcultural cleavage structure widened and tightened
after the First World War, Calvinist, Catholic and Social-
Democratic normative dispositions with respect to economic order
and industrial organization, underwent a remarkable convergence.
Under the experience of the Great Depression the ideological
distances between the Calvinist, Catholic, and Social Democratic
pillars narrowed dramatically. In the 1930s the Social Democratic
party and the social democratic union federation abandoned Marxism.
The Catholic party and its affiliated unions, afraid of losing
their large proletarian constituencies to the Social Democrats,
gradually came to accept more state interference in the overall
economic order. The Calvinist and Catholic principles of
'sovereignty in private circles' and 'subsidiarity', remainders of
the 19th century State-Church struggle, sanctioning an
interventionist role of the state solely where private initiative
was lacking, were reinterpreted and renegotiated in favor of a more
prominent role of the state in industrial organization. In due
course, the two Christian-Democratic principles came to neatly
coincide with the newly adopted Social-Democratic conception of
'functional decentralization'. Together, the three ideas laid the
normative foundation of the overall ideological umbrella of 'class-
interdependence' of post-1945 corporatist framework. This
ideological reconciliation had hardly any lasting effect on the
solidly pillarized organizational space and the 'frozen' highly
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structured political system in which subcultural loyalties still
determined the vote of the greater part of the electorate.
Before the outset of the Second World War the three historical
preconditions for Dutch corporatism were virtually in place. First
of all, we find an institutional setting and a frame of mind of
shared political space of on the part of state actors. Secondly,
we encounter a pattern of industrial relations that is vertically
integrated, but not sufficiently horizontally integrated. The
industrial relations system continued to be divided along pillar
lines. Yet, this horizontal segmentation was about to be bridged
to promote 'social peace' by the ideological congruence with
respect to national political economy issues among the different
pillar elites, when the Nazi-Germans marched into the Netherlands
on the first of May 1940.
Although it is generally believed, with some reason, that
Dutch economic policy-making made a clear break with the past in
1945, I have attempted to tone down the alleged watershed in these
historical chapters by underscoring the importance of the effect
of the survival of the pre-existing legacy of sharing political
space in the process of the nation-state building in the
Netherlands, and the timing and handling of the 'school issue' and
the 'social question' in shaping the three historical genetically
relevant co-ordinates of Dutch corporatism.
The experience of the Nazi-occupation and socio-economic chaos
left behind by the Germans after the Liberation undoubtedly
encouraged the willingness and ability of leaders of the organized
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interests of capital and labor and state authorities alike to
pursue policies of mutual accord in managing the war-stricken Dutch
economy. Still, the innovative and seemingly unproblematic
institutionalization of a vast complex of corporatist structures,
and the ready approval of state intervention in the spheres of the
economy and industrial relations, especially with regards to
wholesale acceptance of the 'Roman-Red' - Catholic and socialist
coalition - government's policies of wage restraint were the
corollary of political and social developments already at work
before the onset of the Second World War. The origins of the
'harmony model' of political economy were built on prewar forms of
organization and regulation.
6. Corporatist institutional change
The historical-empirical part 3 of the thesis offers a dynamic
explanation of the transformation of corporatist regulation in the
Netherlands in the postwar period. There is a peculiar neglect of
institutional change in the contemporary studies of European
corporatism. Corporatist policy-making may predominate in certain
countries, but if we keep in mind the drastic changes in economy
and society since 1945, it is hard to imagine single and static
patterns of corporatist regulation in these economies. The chapters
7 and 8, therefore, move from the heuristically fixed assessment
of the emergence of corporatist polities in terms of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the three historical preconditions to
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a dynamic examination of the transformation of Dutch corporatism
over the postwar era.
The process of institutional change will be analyzed in a two-
by-two model. The aim of the model is to provide a fairly simple
and parsimonious framework for the analysis of institutional change
wherein the respective preconditions can be studied together,
synthetically. The principal theoretical notion behind the model
is that institutional arrangements take on a specific life of their
own. Once corporatist practices have become institutionalized
patterns of regulation, variation among the genetically relevant
preconditions are not directly translated into shifts in regulatory
policies.
It is appropriate to briefly specify the dynamic model.
Corporatist institutional change is here understood in terms of
two properties: (1) the degree of institutional integration of
organized interests into the public policy-making process; and (2)
the degree of societal support for corporatist policies offered by
the organized interests of capital and labor. The hypothesized
variation of combinations of high and low degrees institutional
integration and high and low levels of societal support identifies
three different patterns of corporatist regulation, which I will
call 'innovative', 'responsive' and 'immobile' corporatism, and one
related non-corporatist form of regulation, which I will call
'corporatist extrication'.
The vertical axis represents the degree of institutional
integration. It concerns the degree to which private and public
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interests are locked into each other, the extent to which the two
invade each other and enlarge their domain at each others' expense.
Institutional integration involves what Claus Offe had called
'public status attribution's. Public status attribution concerns
the extent to which organized interests are recognized by the
state, accorded with privileged status in the public policy-making
framework and endowed with regulatory authorities. In practice,
institutional integration revolves around the capacity of a
relatively independent public/private interest framework for social
and economic regulation. Where there is a low level of integration,
where, for instance, bi- and tripartite bodies are non-existent or
only poorly developed, political economies will lack the
institutional capacity for stable corporatist political exchange
over time. Conversely, institutional integration is increased with
increased public status granted to bi- and tripartite structures.
Since corporatist arrangements require the exercise legitimate
authority, it is postulated that the state has the final control
over the level of institutional integration. State actors lend
authority to administrative rulings and agreements reached by
private actors in corporatist arrangements, as to make them binding
for specific sectors and sometimes whole economies. They have the
decisionist ability to draw organized interests in and out of
Offe, C., 'the attribution of public status to interest groups:
observations on the West German case', in Suzanne Berger (ed),
Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1981, 123-158.
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corporatist regulation. Private interests can only integrate
themselves into corporatist structures with the active compliance
of the state. The vertical axis hereby underscores the relative
importance of the state among the corporate actors in corporatist
bargaining processes. It can be viewed as a combined indicator of
institutional capacity and subjective willingness of the state to
share political space in social and economic regulation.
The postulated 'relative autonomy' of the state does not
suggest that state actors can change the level of integration as
they see fit, as if they were operating a lever. Institutional
arrangements are sticky, as economists say of wages, which tend to
move up more easily than in a downward direction. Once given, a
wage increase is hard to take away. A similar downward stickiness
can be argued with respect to institutional integration, especially
since it concerns the incorporation of private interests into
legislative and administrative provisions.
While the state is posited to have final control over the
level of institutional integration, it has little control over the
degree of support coming from organized interests for corporatist
regulation. It is definitely not the case that the more organized
interests are integrated into the public policy-making process, the
more supportive they will be. The horizontal axis, therefore,
represents the degree of societal support for corporatism in the
political economy. It can be viewed as a combined indicator for
the institutional capacity and subjective willingness on the part
of the organized interests to engage in corporatist bargaining in
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concert with the state. Societal support include interest
representation, interest regulation, and consensus over the
national economic interest. Interest representation refers to the
extent to which organized capital and labor transmit membership
demands to the decision-making center. Interest regulation touches
on the ability to deliver rank-and-file, to ensure compliance with
the agreements reached at the decision-making center. The need to
represent membership and the need to regulate rank-and-file are in
a constant dynamic tension. When this tension is not successfully
managed by the social partners, it can destabilize the corporatist
exchange. This is one of the two reasons why the horizontal axis
is a great deal more fluid than the institutionally sticky vertical
axis.
Alongside effective interest representation and regulation,
societal support also touches on the ability to achieve consensus
between the organized forces of capital and labor over the national
economic interest. Consensus over the national economic interest
is perhaps even more elastic than the associational anxiety of
representation and regulation. Capital and labor each pursue their
own versions of the national economic interest, which are
influenced not only by their respective ideologies, but also by
their perceptions of their specific functional roles and their
self-interested concerns with organizational survival and growth,
re-election, etc. Therefore, rather than assuming consensual
attitudes and effective representation and regulation as being
42
endogenous to corporatist regulation, societal support is taken to
be variable in the model.
The suggested dynamic model contains two distinct advantages
for the interpretation of corporatist institutional change. First
of all, it treats institutional integration and societal support
as two relatively independent variables. The state is posited to
have sufficient primacy over constitutional forms and institutional
structures which cannot be inferred directly from the
configurations of organized interests. Secondly, it also admits an
institutional element in its dynamic, which is typically phrased
without reference to any particular social agent. Once
institutionalized and routinized, corporatist practices have a
logic of their own. Institutional arrangements affect policy-making
by constraining choices, facilitating some and excluding others.
The dynamic model allows institutional and economic conditions and
the goals of the corporate actors to interrelate over time.
It is rather surprising that modern corporatist scholarship,
which has situated itself somewhere between 'society-centered' and
state-centered' approaches to the study of political economy has
paid so little attention to the variability of institutional
integration and societal support and their interrelation, given the
nature of the corporatist practice as a form of political exchange
between government and organized interests, whereby capital and
labor receive privileged influence over public policy-making in
return for guarantees that their membership will behave in ways
considered to adhere to the overall national economic interest.
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While recognizing the so-called 'relative autonomy' of the state
in corporatist practices, many scholars have declined to understand
how its main components interrelate, this especially with respect
to the changing position of the state in corporatist exchange.
Conditions of high societal support for corporatist regulation
and low integration induce 'innovative' corporatism or corporatist
institution-building. Here exceptional political and economic
conditions allow national policy-makers, who are historically
willing to share political space, to set up corporatist structures
with the strong support of organized interests, which are also
historically, both organizationally and ideologically, predisposed
to corporatist exchange. Corporatist innovation usually concerns
a period where bi- and tripartite structures are built into the
political economy as a stable set of institutional arrangements for
the mutual advantage of public and private interests in the
management of social stability, balanced growth, price stability
and high levels of employment.
High societal support combined with high institutional
integration lead to 'responsive' corporatist regulation, where the
corporatist exchange runs smoothly and is successful in achieving
the above goals. This situation concerns the time when corporatist
structures have become solidly institutionalized, organized
interests heavily incorporated in the formulation and
implementation of public policies, together with a high degree of
consensus between the bargaining parties over the national economic
interests. Most corporatist scholars have studied corporatist
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regulation in its 'benign' variant. Peter Katzenstein found that
small European political economies blessed with corporatist
institutions did successfully wither the crises of the 1970s. From
this experience he, subsequently, inferred that corporatist
countries are best able to thrive in a globalizing world economy".
I think it is a priori implausible that a particular set of
institutions would generally be favorable to economic performance.
The suggested dynamic model, therefore, contains next to the benign
variant, a malignant version of corporatist regulation. The malign
variant of 'immobile' corporatist regulation concerns a situation
where low social support is coupled with high integration. Under
these conditions corporatist institutions are posited in fact to
form barriers to effective social and economic regulation. Manfred
Schmidt has aptly referred to 'immobile' corporatism as a situation
of 'concertation without consensus's.
The condition of 'immobile' corporatism reveals that
corporatist political exchange is driven by a paradoxical tradeoff.
This is best understood by focusing on the state among the
regulatory actors. When state policy-makers engage in corporatist
regulation, they essentially choose to make themselves more
dependent on organized interests, by integrating them into the
Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, Industrial
Policy in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.
Manfred Schmidt, 'the politics of unemployment: rates of
unemployment and labor market policy', in Western European
Politics, vol. 7, 5-24.
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regulatory process, seeking in return a greater control over the
policy-making process and their respective outcomes. This tradeoff
is linked to the two main components corporatist regulation, the
extent to which policy-makers find societal support from organized
interests for their policy objectives and the degree to which
organized interest are formally integrated into the policy-making
framework on the other. Immobile corporatism shows that when
societal support wanes, state actors become imprisoned in an
institutional setting that no longer functions, resulting in
corporatist policy inertia. The dynamic model posits that state
policy-makers can chose among two options in case of corporatist
immobility. Either they can attempt to reinvigorate societal
support and try to move back to the more responsive variant of
corporatist regulation. Alternatively, they pull back from
institutional integration by breaking out of the standard
corporatist arrangements and attempt to disengage the state from
its dependence on societal support. The latter strategy is here
referred to as 'corporatist extrication'. It combines low levels
of societal support and a low degree institutional integration
since state actors here actively disconnect institutional
integration. Corporatist extrication indicates a authoritative
style of policy-making on the part of the state within a
corporatist setting, in which state policy-makers set policies more
autonomously, as societal support for corporatist bargains wanes.
While having the autonomy to deal with economic problems in
an authoritative fashion, the state officials will most likely
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believe themselves to be in need for overall consensus when
societal support begins to decline. The alternative option of
'corporatist extrication' is severely constrained by heavily
institutionalized corporatist administrative and organizational
routines. At first, the state will try to pursue the avenue of
reinvigorating societal support by increasing the degree of
institutional integration.
Favorably past experiences with well established organized
interest with administrative and executive abilities and capacities
to represent and regulate membership and previous legacies of
negotiation, consultation, and cooperation, form 'exit' barriers
against uncoupling the corporatist exchange. The more
institutionalized and routinized corporatist regulation, both in
terms of its institutional interdependence and in terms of the
subjective commitment on the part of the state to share political
space, the harder it will be to abrogate corporatist regulation.
As Peter Hall has suggested, state actors will often need a
learning process to change embedded political attitudes and
institutional arrangements. The extent and length of policy inertia
and the concomitant learning process in part depend on the degree
of dependence - the 'exit' barriers - corporatist arrangements have
previously developed. In the dynamic model, declining social
support is implicitly the prime mover in the transition away from
responsive to immobile corporatism. The cause of immobilism,
however, and the length of the period of policy inertia, i.e.
reluctance of the state to disengage itself from corporatist
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bargaining procedures is intimately linked to the degree of
institutional integration.
The interrelation between institutional integration and














7. The paradox of the 'harmony model' of political economy
The contemporary historical part of the dissertation examined the
transformation of the Dutch 'harmony model' from its establishment
in the late forties to its 'Golden Age' in the 1950s and early
1960s through to its fragmentation in the 1970s and early eighties.
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The exercise is centered around wage regulation, which has been
generally been recognized as the core of Dutch corporatism. The
chapters 7 and 8 take on a 'state-centered' bent . The focus is on
how the relative autonomy of the national state among the corporate
actors in corporatist arrangements changes over time. The overall
examination is geared towards an understanding of why and how the
government initiates corporatist arrangements, how it behaves
within the corporatist setting, and how, why and under what
conditions it, sometimes, steps outside corporatist practices.
The postwar transformation of Dutch corporatism can be
interpreted in terms of the dynamic interrelation between its main
components of institutional integration and societal support.
Corporatist regulation in the Netherlands evolved from a short
'innovative' period of institution-building from 1945 to 1950,
through to the celebrated 'responsive' pattern between 1950 and
1963, which gradually gave way to radicalizing and decentralizing
tendencies on the societal front after 1965 to induce an 'immobile'
form of corporatism from 1972 until 1982, the year government
sidetracked the corporatist framework to set public policies
authoritatively.
Chapter 7 sketches an almost ideal-typical period of swift
institution-building followed by the long term success of the
See Peter B. Evens, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (eds) ,
Bringing the state back in, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1985, Eric A. Nordlinger, On the autonomy of the
democratic state, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
1981.
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policies of corporatist wage restraint until the mid-1960s. Within
less than a decade, Dutch corporatism became institutionalized
under the legal framework of the 1945 'Extraordinary Decree on
Industrial Relations' or BBA, which remained in effect until 1969.
Immediately after the Liberation government vigorously sought to
share political space with the representatives of the organized
interests of capital and labor. organized capital and labor, on
their part, were exceptionally eager to collaborate and negotiate
with each other in concertation with the state on behalf of their
membership within the newly established exemplary corporatist
framework of the institutions of the bipartite Foundation of Labor
(Stichting van de Arbeid) and the Social Economic Council (Sociaal
Economische Raad). The central federations had almost absolute
regulative control and administrative and executive power over
their respective affiliate associations and rank-and-file
membership in the late 1940s and 1950s.
The erection of the Foundation of Labor and the Social
Economic Council in respectively 1944 and 1950 did mark a new era
for the Dutch political economy with respect to the level of
corporatist institutional integration. Together the two
institutions played prominent roles in the long-term success of
consensual wage regulation during the age of hardship and economic
reconstruction from the end of the Second World War to 1963. The
Foundation of Labor arose from resistance contacts under the Nazi-
German occupation between leaders of the Dutch trade unions and
important employers. The Foundation was established as a
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consultative institution on issues of industrial relations. Its
main objective was to ensure good and permanent organizational
cooperation between business and trade unions. While intended only
as a private advisory council to government, the Foundation came
to be closely involved in economic policy-making. In due course,
the Foundation evolved as the principal forum for collective
bargaining over annual wage accords.
The Social Economic Council, unequivocally the pinnacle
institution of Dutch corporatism, was inaugurated under the
Organization of Industry Act of 1950 as a tripartite counseling
institution for government. The Bill stipulated that government was
obliged to consult the Council before introducing social and
economic policies to parliament. The Council included 30 official
representatives of organized labor and business, and 15 independent
experts, so-called 'crown-members', appointed by government.
Representing the national economic interest in the compromise, the
'crown-members' to the Council were routinely professors in
economics or law of the major Dutch universities and the respective
directors the Dutch central bank (De Nederlandse Bank) and the
Central Plan Bureau (Centraal Plan Bureau). The Central Plan Bureau
of 1945 was initially intended as the public agency of economic
planning, but got underway as the official economic forecasting
institute of the Netherlands. At least until the first half of the
1960s the unanimous reports and recommendations of the Council were
seldom ignored by government, to the extent that questions arose
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in parliament as to whether government has retained its executive
independence vis-a-vis the Council.
By the early 1950s, Dutch corporatist regulation could rely
on a high degree of institutional integration coupled with high
levels of societal support for corporatist incomes policies. The
'responsive' system generally functioned smoothly up until the
early 1960s. Most remarkably was the participation and consent of
the Dutch trade unions to the stringent system of wage
determination. Throughout the 1950s the central federations
continued to allow for reductions in real wages in favor of
industrial growth. The policies of wage restraint encouraged the
Dutch 'economic miracle' of the era of postwar growth. Charles
Maier has aptly referred to this period as the era of the 'politics
of production', of class-conflict moderation through economic
growth and the de-ideologization of issues of political economy
into questions of productivity and efficiency. Strike activity was
concomitantly exceptionally low. In short, the Dutch corporatist
formula proved remarkably successful in stabilizing liberal
capitalism in the first decades of the postwar era.
The 1960s were dominated by a gradual breakdown of societal
support for corporatist regulation. As labor markets tightened in
the late 1950s, both labor and capital began to favor decentralized
collective bargaining. Unions saw their membership decline and came
to realize that they were left free to fend for themselves. Three
years of wage explosions followed. After two decades of centrally
guided incomes policy real wage jumped 9%, 15% and 10.9% in
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respectively 1963, 1964, and 1965. Government asked the Foundation
of Labor to advise on a better system of wage determination to be
formalized under a new Wage Law, to replace the BBA of 1945. The
new Law of 1970 prompted the most conflictual episode in the Dutch
system of industrial relations after 1945.
In the latter half of the 1960s the 'harmony model' started
to crumble. During what has generally referred to as the era of the
resurgence of class conflict in European industrial relations,
Dutch corporatism moved from the 'harmony' to a so-called
'conflict' model of concertation. Chapter 8 examines the ascending
political immobility of corporatist regulation from the late 1960s
onwards in terms of government's response to the waning of societal
support for corporatist wage regulation. The corporatist political
practice was on the retreat with respect to all of its conditional
historical dimensions. Next to decentralizing trends in the overall
system of industrial relations, we encounter substantial divergence
in ideological outlook of the respective social partners, both
rejecting, for altogether different reasons, the state-led
incorporation of organized interests in 'responsible' incomes
policies. Radicalizing tendencies at the union base made it
difficult to regulate affiliate unions and rank-and-file membership
from the top by the national centers. It brought a more assertive
posture on the part of the leaders vis-a-vis government and
employers, reflecting the need to channel unrest as well as to
represent the radical demands of the base at the decision-making
center. Socialist and Catholic union federations withdrew from the
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Foundation of Labor's centralized bargaining processes, while also
boycotting the Social Economic Council, in order to apply political
pressure on government. The frequency of wild cat strikes increased
dramatically. While the union movement came to adopted a more
radical stance, employers turned to 'laissez-faire' neo-liberalism.
Between 1970 and 1982, despite annual efforts, no successful
incomes accord was reached, except for the failed 1972 settlement.
The 1982 accord concerned an unusual agreement which should not be
mistaken for a conventual 'social contract', stipulating wage
guidelines and working conditions. The 1982 compromise proposed a
reduction of working hours through the renegotiation of collective
bargaining agreements in order to create jobs and encourage various
forms of work-sharing when the rate unemployment reached 12%.
The performance of the Dutch economy over the last decade and
a half points to a critical paradox in accepted corporatist theory.
Given that the Netherlands were, - and still are -, furnished with
an exceptional and firmly institutionalized concertative apparatus
of bi- and tripartite corporatist bodies, accommodating employers,
workers, and government interests, this framework should, have
incited a flexible response, reducing the vulnerability of the
Dutch open economy in the face of the multifold recessions since
the early 1970s. Yet, the Dutch experience of the late 1970s and
early 1980s bluntly refutes this benevolent vision of corporatist
success. Since the foremost blessing of corporatism is said to be
good labor market performance, the abominable employment record of
the Netherlands from the mid-1970s onwards throws into question
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the proficiency of corporatist arrangements as a device for crisis
management. The same elaborate and solidly institutionalized
corporatist framework, which had so successfully contributed to the
recovery, reconstruction and modernization of the Dutch political
economy after 1945, was no longer able to curb the economic crisis,
to arrest the massive rise in unemployment, peaking at 14,2% in
1984, and contain the deterioration of social services.
The collapse of the centralized system of wage determination
seriously reduced the scope of the Foundation of Labor in the Dutch
political economy. This, together with growing inability of the
Social Economic Council's to arrive at consensual recommendations,
brought government in the end to bypass the corporatist framework
and to heed the advice of the Scientific Council of Government
Policy, whose technocratic recommendations, based on independent
expertise rather than corporatist representation, urged state
actors to pursue more independent policies. With its publication
of the 1980 inquiry into the 'Place and Future of Dutch Industry',
the Scientific Council issued a biting critique of Dutch
corporatis. The study affirmed that corporatist institutions
actually hindered the necessary readjustments facing Dutch
manufacturing in the eighties and nineties. This and other reports
of independent committees have since added to the reduced
N Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Plaats en
toekomst van de Nederlandse industrie, Den Haag,
Staatsuitgeverij, 1980.
55
willingness of government to help accommodate divergent interests
in a corporatist manner.
From the early 1970s onwards, the state became gradually
imprisoned in an institutional framework that no longer functioned.
The continued desire for policy-control over wage determination on
the part of the state prompted government to impose wage measures
on the social partners in 1971, 1974, 180 (twice), 1981, and 1982,
which induced a vicious circle of social conflict and concomitant
policy inertia.
Since the decentralizing tendencies in the industrial
relations system at large and the radicalization of the trade union
movement are well documented for the Dutch case, I wish to
concentrate in the contemporary part of the thesis on the extent
to which the state had made itself increasingly dependent on
corporatist regulation over the long period of postwar growth, and
how it, after many authoritative impositions, reluctantly untied
itself from a corporatist stalemate in the early 1980s. It is my
contention that the alleged radicalization and decentralization in
the Dutch corporatist system at the societal axis should be studied
in connection with the state's dependence of societal support for
corporatist regulation at the axis of institutional integration.
The central tenet of chapter 8 focuses on the intra-cabinet splits
over concertative or induced versus authoritative or state imposed
wage regulation under a condition low societal support and a severe
unemployment and ensuing fiscal crisis. Viewed in this light, the
transformation of Dutch corporatism is best described in terms of
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fragmentation, rather than in terms of the prevailing picture of
greater decentralization in the sphere of industrial relations.
8. corporatism, consociationalism and pillarization revisited
The paradox of the precipitous fragmentation of corporatist
regulation in the Netherlands can be illuminated with reference to
the realms of the social and political under which the 'harmony
model' functioned after 1945. The corporatist era of extremely
successful reconstruction, rapid industrialization, sustained
economic growth, full employment, and industrial peace, from the
late 1940s until the mid-1960s, went along with two important
social and political corollaries. On the one hand, it concurred
with what political scientists have labeled the high period of
consociational democracy. On the other hand, it coincided with what
sociologists have referred to as the prime era of pillarization.
The collapse of the 'harmony model', evident from the political
immobility of the corporatist system of wage determination and the
waning of the influence of the bi- and tripartite corporatist
institutional framework in social and economic regulation from the
late 1960s onwards, ran parallel to the congruent process of
depillarization, the swift erosion of the segmented cleavages, and
the corresponding crisis of consociational democracy in the
Netherlands.
The unanticipated coincidence of the innovative triumph of the
Dutch 'harmony model' of political economy and the long-term
success of the policies of wage restraint, the permanence of
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consociational accommodation in the political arena, and the
persistence of the segmentation of organizational space and
traditional loyalties along pillar lines, suggests a complex
historical interconnectedness between pillarization,
consociationalism and corporatism during the initial postwar
decades. Conversely, the unforeseen parallelism of the recent
immobility of corporatist regulation, the crisis of consociational
democracy, and the decomposition of the pillars and erosion of
subcultural loyalties, thereafter, intimates a similarly complex
relationship between depillarization, the declining viability of
consociational rule, and the fragmentation of corporatism.
In order to, finally, theoretically disclose the internal
dynamics of these two contrasting parallelisms and the interrelated
unintended consequences they produced in the postwar period,
chapter 9 will re-examine the main theories of the extra-
parliamentary political practice of corporatism, the parliamentary
political practice of consociationalism, and the societal dynamic
of pillarization. The objective here is to elucidate some of the
theoretical interconnections between the three analytically and
empirically distinct socio-political practices in terms of
'adequate' and 'inadequate' correspondences or, to use a concept
employed by Max Weber, 'elective affinities'. In this final return
to theory I seek to identify similarities in the respective
theoretical 'modus operandi' of the three related socio-political
phenomena, which may help to illuminate the particular strength the
responsive 'harmony model' in the 1950s and the exceptional
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weakness of the immobile corporatist framework from the late-1960s
onwards.
The principal objective of the thesis is to disclose, both
historically and theoretically, how the unique and indeterminate
path of Dutch corporatism originated, developed, and ultimately
dispersed. It examines the extent to which this peculiar experience
of corporatism has been molded by the political and social
synchronic conjunctures of the ascent and demise of the political
practice of consociationalism and the related societal dynamics of
pillarization and depillarization. I maintain that the intimate
historical links of Dutch corporatism to consociationalism and
pillarization can only be made comprehensible if traced,
diachronically, to the formative moments of political accommodation
and subcultural segmentation in Dutch history. The study examines
the legacies of the 17th Century Republic of the United Netherlands
and the revealing period of religious conflict and working class
protest in the last quarter of the 19th Century, moments which
induced the establishment of consociationalism and the
institutionalization of pillarization at the turn of the 20th
Century. In their initial historical materializations
consociationalism and pillarization were consequential in shaping
the origins of Dutch corporatism in the first two decades of the
20th century and the subsequent tentative establishment of
corporatist ideas, procedures and structures during the interwar
years, through to the formal creation of the celebrated bi-and
tripartite institutional framework of the 'harmony model' after
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1945. Conversely, in their simultaneous downfalls,
consociationalism and pillarization, prepared the precipitous
dislocation of Dutch corporatism from the late 1960s onwards.
While the recent breakdown of the 'harmony model' is not the
primary focal point, the thesis' historical endeavor is ultimately
to advance an explanation of the recent 'political immobilism' of
Dutch economic policy-making. It could be argued that the extra-
parliamentary political practice of corporatist concertation
faltered as a device for crisis management in the 1970s, because
it was based on a fragile institutional foundation, which, for as
long as it lasted, depended heavily on the historical, nationally
specific societal dynamic of pillarization and parliamentary
practice of consociationalism. As the institutional basis of the
'harmony model' had been raised on a pillarized cleavage structure
and the stable operation of consociational politics, this
supportive underpinning fragmented, before the 1970s setbacks, when
the crisis of consociationalism of erratic party politics and
unstable coalition governments and the process of depillarization
dawned in Dutch politics and society. The crisis of 'concertation
without consensus' only became apparent in the late 1970s, when it
provoked 'political immobilism' in economic policy-making,
especially with regards to severe and intricately related
unemployment and fiscal crises. Dutch politics and society have
since failed to generate a new support basis to sustain viable
corporatist policies.
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The same set of social and political forces that supported the
original success of the 'harmony model' after 1945, in retrospect,
had, in a sense, also sowed the seeds for its recent demise. The
consociational pillarized elites saw their peculiar pattern of
corporatism gradually being subverted by the 'secularizing' force
of the success of the socio-economic order they had helped to
create, by bringing about material welfare, social security and
full employment. Or as the Dutch historian E.H. Kossmann put the
ironic consequence of Dutch reconstruction and economic prosperity:
If the men who after 1945 exerted themselves to
reconstruct the ruined economy had retained their prewar
(pillarized, ACH) political organization and continued
to profess their belief in pluralistic stability
(consociationalism, ACH) - perfectly suited they
discovered, to serve a framework for economic expansion
on an unprecedented scale - the young men and women of
the 1960s, after economic suicess had been achieved, felt
embarrassed by those relics-.
Most ironical is the present counterintuitive reality that in an
era where long-term subcultural loyalties have been replaced by
increasingly secular public policy concerns, among which prevail
economic goals such as full employment and low inflation, the Dutch
'harmony model', contrary to textbook assumptions, no longer proves
a viable instrument in delivering these secular material demands.
To conclude, Dutch corporatism came into being under
'transient' preconditions, which are no longer available. The
historical preconditions of Dutch corporatism were, for the most
Kossmann, E.H., The low countries 1980-1940, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1978, p. 683.
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part, shaped by the institutionalization, formalization, and
routinization of the parliamentary political practice of
consociationalism and the societal dynamic of pillarization.
Consociationalism encouraged the institutionalization of earlier
traditions of sharing political space as a rule of procedure in
Dutch modern politics. Pillarization motivated the formation of
centralized however segmented functional organized interests.
Together the two socio-political phenomena stimulated the diffusion
of normative conceptions of rank-and-file loyalty and congruent
ideological dispositions of class-interdependence. As these the two
practices lost their institutional clout from the 1960s onwards,
so did corporatism.
The illustrious 'harmony model' lived on the borrowed time of
consociationalism and pillarization. Behind this historical
dependence on the two social and political forces beyond the
original reach and scope of the economic interests and power and
authority relations of the corporate actors in the corporatist
game, - i.e. the democratic state and the 'peak' representatives
of the functional organized interests of capital and labor -, lies
what I have coined the 'historical fragility of Dutch corporatism',
a title which conjures up an image of history haunting Dutch
economic policy-making to this day.
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